Optimal employment and investment policies in self-financed producer cooperatives by BARTLETT, Will
320
tSUl
E U I W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No.85/162
OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT 
































































































No part of this paper may be 
reproduced in any form without 
permission of the author.
(C) Will Bartlett. 
Printed in Italy in April 1985 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana





























































































I am grateful to Pierre Dehez, Alexis Jacquemin and 
Mario Nuti for helpful comments at various stages in the 
preparation of this paper, although any errors are my own 
responsibility. Earlier drafts of the paper were present­
ed at the Workshop on Labour-Managed Firms, European Uni­
versity Institute, April 1984; the conference of the De­
velopment Studies Association, Bradford, September 1984 
and the International Conference on Economic Policies and 
Control Theory, Venice, February 1985. Financial assist­
ance for the research was provided by the Project on Work­
ers' Participation and Enterprise Performance in Western 






















































































































































































That a producer cooperative sector may form part of 
an employment-creating programme of industrial restructur­
ing and reform in Western Europe has been given increasing 
attention in recent years. However, existing firms of 
this type often find difficulty in raising outside finance 
for expansion. In this paper it is shown that the long- 
run prospects for employment creation within such firms, 
when they are entirely dependent upon internal sources of 
accumulation, are rather bleak, even though they may, upon 
start-up, provide a low cost-per-workplace and thus gener­
ate relatively much employment per unit of initial capi­
tal. The analysis is thus consistent with the view that 
an active policy of new-firm creation, and the development 
of specialized outside credit institutions would be impor­
tant measures of policy to enhance the long-run job-crea­





















































































































































































OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT POLICIES
IN SELF-FINANCED PRODUCER COOPERATIVES
As unemployment in Western Europe follows its seeming­
ly irresistible upward course, increasing attention is be­
ing given to the countercyclical growth in the numbers of 
producer cooperatives. Either in a defensive or innovative 
mode, such organizations are coming to be seen as at least 
a part of a possible solution to the withering base of pro­
ductive employment opportunities in conventional capitalist 
enterprises. Skills and enthusiasms which would otherwise 
be dissipated in fruitless job-search on the dole may be 
preserved and enhanced in organizations which reverse the 
orthodox production relationship between capital and hired 
labour.
This paper addresses the issue of the employment and 
growth behaviour of producer cooperatives by analyzing a 
dynamic model of a "labour-managed firm". Analysis of such 
firms originated in the classic works of Ward (1958) and 
Vanek (1970). These and subsequent developments in the 
theory have been succinctly set out in texts by Ireland and 
Law (1982) and Stephen (1984). Most analyses have focused 
the discussion on the conditions of static equilibrium, ei­
ther of a fixed membership cooperative with hours variable
(Sen, 1966; Berman, 1977) or a variable membership coopera-
1tive with fixed hours as in Ward's original analysis. 
Furubotn (1971) was the first to extend the static model of 
the labour-managed firm by requiring a fixed membership co­




























































































ral consumption. In a later article (Furubotn, 1976) the 
initial membership sets an exogenously determined upper 
limit to the labour force over the time horizon so as to 
retain decision-making control. The principal result is 
to show that some self-financed investment will be under­
taken by the firm, but the actual path of accumulation is 
not analyzed. Atkinson (1973), Sapir (1980) and Bonin 
(1983) analyze labour-managed firms which finance expan­
sion from external sources. Atkinson presents a model of
2'managerial1 labour-management in which the firm can grow 
faster than the expansion of demand in the industry via 
expenditure on sales promotion. Sapir presents a model of 
a "tenured" labour-managed firm in which there is a cen­
tral group of skilled workers who hire unskilled employees
3but may admit them to membership after costly training. 
Bonin analyzes a model which depends upon costly adjust­
ment of both membership and capital with the result that 
the sensitivity of optimal policies to parameter shifts 
depends upon the direction of adjustment, i.e. whether the 
firm is expanding or contracting.
However, the analysis of the labour-managed firm un­
der external financing is not very appropriate in the case
of most Western European producer cooperatives since these
« 4typically face extremely imperfect capital markets. It 
is therefore more plausible to model such firms under a 
regime of self-financed expansion. Moreover where exter­
nal financing is available, a matching amount of internal
5finance is often stipulated. This is understandable, 




























































































served, the problem of moral hazard which exists when cred­
itors have no control over the disposition of funds will 
drive lenders to seek to obtain some evidence of commitment 
from the borrowing cooperative. The assumption of self-fi­
nancing, in addition, highlights the essence of the problem 
of growth for the labour-managed firm in that future gains 
in consumption are derived at the expense of reductions in 
current consumption, and also, that membership expansion is 
attractive to support any capital accumulation programme, 
but simultaneously unattractive since its benefits have to 
be shared over a wider workforce.
In the next section, therefore, an analysis of an in­
ternally financed labour-managed firm is presented which 
follows from and develops the model of Furubotn (1971).
The major difference is that the assumption of an exoge­
nously fixed labour force is dropped. Rather, the level of 
optimal employment is derived endogenously as a solution to
g
the optimization problem.
Consider a labour-managed firm maximizing the dis­
counted utility of consumption per head of the workforce.
Thus the actual size of the workforce is not in itself a
7direct consideration in the utility function. The cooper­
ative is in a competitive market environment for its out­
put, facing a product price p = 1. Output at time t, Q(t), 
is produced by means of capital K(t) and labour L(t), ac­
cording to the production function Q(t) = F(K(t),L(t)), 
which is characterized by increasing returns to scale at 




























































































higher levels of output, so that the scale elasticity e(K,L),
g
equal to the sum of the output elasticities, varies smoothly
from higher to lower values passing through the unit value at
9a unique locus in K-L space.
It is of particular interest to consider the case where, 
for given L, the function is convex for low values of K and 
concave at higher values. Thus we assume F ,F > 0; FK' L LK
F > 0; Ftt < 0 and FT„, - 0. Somewhat similar versions of aKL “ LL “ KK <
convex-concave production function have received increasing 
attention recently in studies of dynamic optimization under 
central planning (Skiba, 1978) and under monopolistic capi­
talism (Dechert, 1983, 1984). In the present case we consid­
er a labour-managed firm with its distinctive maximand, which 
saves and invests a proportion s(t) of its net revenue, y(t),
, /JU. Q ( t ) - rK ( t) , . .where y(t) = ----- -— - ---  where m  turn r is a fixed unitL (t)
charge on capital, which may be taken to represent a capital 
tax, or a minimum return which the cooperative wished to make 
on its capital stock, reflecting the interest rate on outside lending op­
portunities. It is further assumed that physical capital depre­
ciates at a constant proportional rate 6, and that the coop­
erative discounts future income at a rate of time preference
Thus the maximization problem for an infinite horizon 10
is :
max u{ (1 - s (t) ) y (t) }e Ptdt
subject to £(t) = s (t) *y (t) *L (t) - 6K(t) 
K (o) = Ko
































































































(From this point on the time dependence notation "x(t)" will 
be replaced by the notation "x" where time dependence is 
treated implicitly.)
The utility function is assumed to have the following 
properties:
u' (c) > 0 ; u" (c) < 0 ; lim u' (c) = 00 v)
c-t-o
In this problem K is the state variable and the control var­
iables are s and L. The current value Hamiltonian is given 
by:
H = u( (1 - s)-y(K,L)} + m{s*y(K,L)*L - 6>K} vi)
where m = m(t) is the current value multiplier associated 
with ii) , and is equal to e pt*ip(t) where ^(t) is the ordi­
nary multiplier.
The optimality conditions are as follows:
9H > S = 1—  = u'(c)•(-y) + m*y*L — 0 as Q < s < 1 vii)
o S < -s = 0
The case where s = 1 is ruled out by assumption v). In the 
following analysis we consider the case where vii) holds 
with equality and s > 0 throughout.
 ̂TT _ _
—  = u' (c) • (1 - s)yT + m*s-/y_L + y/ < 0 as L > 0
viii)
and again we consider only the case where L > 0 throughout, 
so viii) holds with equality.
m = pm - E = (p + <S)m - u' (c) • (1 - s) *y - m* s • y • L ix) 
K i\ i\






























































































is the transversality condition.
From vii) it can be seen that, along the optimal path:
Thus the shadow valuation of investment, m, is inversely 
related to consumption per head (for given L), as one might 
expect. However, for given levels of consumption per head, 
the more workers among whom the benefits of an additional 
unit of investment must be spread, the lower the shadow 
valuation of that unit.
Now, from viii) and xi) we obtain:
(1 - s)y + s (y + y/L) = 0 xii)
Li Li
Thus:
F = (1 - s)y xiii)
Li
Equation xiii) is quite striking. It shows that for 
any given momentary level of savings (which varies along 
the optimal path) the optimal employment level is found by 
equating the marginal product of labour with the level of 
consumption per head. This could be considered to be a 
sort of "golden rule" for cooperative investment in which, 
however, employment itself is an endogenous choice varia­
ble, rather than being exogenously determined by the "natu­
ral growth rate" as in the standard one-sector neoclassical 






























































































The intuitive explanation of the rule is that employment
of an additional worker adds to the total saving of the firm
by an amount s-F . However it changes the utility of the av-
Li
erage consumption level by -u = -u'*c = -u'*(1 - s)-y . The
value of the extra investment measured in units of consumption
is m*s*F = u'*s*F /L. When these two effects are equated,L L
the rule shown in xiii) emerges.
The optimal employment level is found at L where F and
Li
(1 - s)y intersect at C. Should the level of savings fall to 
zero optimal employment would fall to L. At this point the 
marginal product function intersects the average revenue per 
head at its maximum at A. This is precisely the static maxi­
mization solution originally presented by Ward (1958). Thus 
Ward's solution emerges as a special case of the present mod­




























































































the other extreme, if the firm were entirely "growth-minded" 
so that the maximization was applied only to the accumula­
tion term in vi), then for such a "megalomaniac" firm (to 
use Vanek's phrase) the equilibrium would be found at D with 
an optimal employment of L. These are limiting values of 
employment, and L represents an equilibrium of these two 
opposing tendencies, which is established along the optimal 
path. Clearly, when intertemporal considerations are taken 
into account the worker-managed firm will employ more labour 
for a given capital stock than previous analysis, based upon 
static optimization, has allowed for. This is important for 
the comparison of economic systems, since a capitalist firm 
with similar technological possibilities and facing similar 
market conditions and a wage rate w, will produce at a point 
such as B (where it is earning positive profits). The 
standard comparison is then between points A and B showing 
the labour-managed firm to be employment restrictive rela­
tive to its capitalist counterpart (Stephen, 1984). However 
in an intertemporal model under self-financing, the compari­
son is between points B and C. An illustrative example is
shown in Figure 1 where it is the capitalist firm which is
1 2relatively employment restrictive. In general however, 
the comparison between points B and C may go either way, but 
the important point is that the supposed superiority of the 
capitalist firm in this respect no longer applies.
Continuing with the analysis, from ii) and ix) and us­
ing conditions xi) and xiii) we can obtain the equations of 
motion of the system as:




























































































ft = F(K,L) - LF (K,L) - (6 + r)K xv)
J_l
and the equilibrium of the system satisfies m = ft = 0. Now 
xiv) has two roots by virtue of the convexity-concavity of 
the production function:
Fig. 2
The two solutions are F (K. ,L. ) = p + 6 + r, i =  1,2.
K 1 1
Substitution into xv) gives the two solutions for ft = 0, 
namely:
, * Jfc. , Jfee(K. ,L . ) = 1 + pv.(K. ,L . ) xvi)i i i l l
where v is the capital-output ratio. Thus the two equilib­
ria are in the increasing returns to scale region of the 
production function.^
Now, xi) and xiii) together imply that along an opti­



























































































xvii)m-L = u'/F (K,L)/J_J
which implicitly gives L as a function of K and m. There­
fore we may write
L = <j> (K,m) xviii)
(along an optimal path), and it can be easily shown (see 
Appendix) that
<b < 0 , <f> < 0  xix)m K
whenever the elasticity of marginal utility is not unrea- 
1 4sonably high. The equations of motion of the state and 
costate variables (K and m) can now be written as a system 
of autonomous differential equations:
m = -m/FK (K, <j> (K,m) ) -  (p + 6 + r ) _ /  =  ^  (K,m) xx)
£ = F (K, <J> (K ,m) ) - (r + 6)K - 4> (K,m) -F (K, cj> (K,m) ) = ip2 (K,m)
xxi)




( F +  F d> )
KK KL > A „  , „  ,  > .------------------------------- < 0 a s F  + F  d> < 0
. . F ^ t <j) KK KL ^K
m=0 KL m xxii)
dm
dK
(F - (r K
fc=0
+ 6) - LF - LF d> ) ’_____ LK LL tK
-l f tt 4)LL m
><
f k - (r + 6) < LFlr + LFll K
as
xxiii)
Equation xxii) will be positive for small K when F is 
large enough to be the dominant term. At larger values of 
K, the expression will have a negative sign. Expression 
xxiii) is sign indeterminate.



























































































- 1 1 -
is - -"'kl - /?k - <p + 5 + 1/ ? 0
it -which is positive near K ,L when /•/ = 0.
 ̂ >
—  = F - (r + 6) - LF - L F  d> < 0  3K K V ' LK LL
xxiv)
xxv)
which has the same sign as xxiii). At (K ,L ) both xxv)
and xxiii) have sign given by p < LF + LF <J> , and willLK LL K
therefore be negative for "small" p, positive for "large" 
p. These sign changes affect the dynamics symmetrically 
and so do not alter the quantitative nature of the solution 
paths. (We could say the system was "structurally stable").






























































































For any initial capital endowment K , the firm chooses
an employment level and savings rate so as to place itself
on the optimal path. If Kq < , then a gradual process
of capital accumulation takes place until the optimal capi-
1 5tal stock is reached. However, since <j> < 0, the labourK
force would be gradually reduced along such an optimal 
path. The intuitive reason is as follows. When the capi­
tal stock is low, in order to achieve desired savings, for 
any given savings rate relatively much labour must be em­
ployed (i.e. relative to the static case— see Fig. 1). 
However, as the capital stock rises relatively less labour 
is needed to produce output from which savings may be made. 
Moreover, as the equilibrium is approached, the savings 
rate diminishes, so a movement "up" the labour marginal 
product curve takes place, bringing about a further reduc­
tion in labour input. At equilibrium, the.savings rate is 
just sufficient to cover depreciation and the firm produces 
at a level in y-L space formally equivalent to that de­
scribed by the static model. Notice also that since F >KL
0, the marginal product of capital curve shifts down with
the reduction in labour input. Thus the target capital 
jfestock (K̂  ) recedes as it is approached. If this effect
were very strong an equilibrium might not be attained.
This explains the presence of the term F in equationsKL
xxii-xxiv). (See also equation A8 in the Appendix.) Simi­
larly if p were "very high" (so that p + 6 + r were above 
the maximum marginal capital product) no equilibrium will 
be attained, reflecting the implied unwillingness of work­
ers to forego present consumption. Notice also that along 




























































































vestment is increasing (since L is decreasing). This is 
analogous to the "reverse flexible accelerator" effect de­
scribed by Dechert (1983) for the case of a monopolistic 
capitalist firm facing increasing returns to scale.
It is precisely because of the presence of increasing 
returns to scale that cooperative workers (in this model) 
are willing to invest at all, in order to capture the gains 
of increasing returns, relative to the opportunity cost of 
capital (r + 6 + p). It seems paradoxical that an equilib­
rium should be found where the marginal productivity of 
capital is still rising, but the explanation is that in the 
labour-managed firm, there is no interest in maximizing the 
return to capital as such. As long as the marginal unit of 
capital is covering its opportunity cost, that is all that
is required. This point may be made clearer by considering
jfethe case where K > K„ . In this case there is an incen-o 1
tive to make net disinvestment by not meeting the full de­
preciation cost of existing assets. Incomes may be maxi­
mized by moving at least close to the maximum of the aver­
age revenue function and augmenting current income by al­
lowing capital to depreciate. However, as capital is run 
down, the average and marginal labour productivity is re­
duced shifting down the maximum of the average productivity 
curve. This forces an increase in employment to maintain 
income per worker as the capital stock diminishes. As long 
as capital marginal productivity is above its opportunity 
cost it pays to keep running down capital and consuming the 
"producer surplus". Eventually the process terminates at
K , at which point the savings rate has risen sufficiently





























































































A model of a self-financed producer cooperative firm 
has been analyzed in a dynamic framework where the level 
of employment and the savings rate are freely chosen. It 
has been shown that, where the initial capital endowment 
is low relative to its equilibrium level, the initial lev­
el of employment will exceed that predicted by previous 
analyses of such firms conducted, as they have mostly 
been, in a static framework. Initial employment levels 
may also exceed those predicted for a similarly placed 
profit maximizing capitalist firm, especially in an envi­
ronment where average labour productivity is low relative 
to the level of wages, e.g. in depressed or declining in­
dustries. However, along the subsequent expansion path as
capital accumulates, employment within the firm is re- 
17duced. This reinforces the commonly accepted notion that 
an active policy of new-firm creation would be necessary 
to maintain aggregate employment in a producer cooperative 
sector. It also provides an easily testable hypothesis 
against which to assess the validity of the income-per- 
worker maximizing model.
That the model may not stand up to such a test is 
suggested by the historical experience of the labour-man- 
aged industrial sector in Yugoslavia, where employment and 
the capital stock have increased simultaneously, despite 
the absence of much new-firm creation, and have not moved 
in an inverse fashion as the current model predicts.
Should the current model be refuted by evidence from West­




























































































search could be oriented in a number of directions. The 
most promising would seem to be the incorporation of ad­
justment costs along the lines of Bonin (1983) and 
Feichtinger (1984), and the modification of the objective 
function of the firm to incorporate a less individualistic 
maximand. A number of possibilities have been suggested in 
the literature, and they are reviewed in Stephen (1984). 
However, the present model, by pushing a simple structure 
to its logical conclusions, has yielded insights that may 
be robust in the face of anything other than a quite radi­
cal reformulation of the theory.
Finally it should be noted that the provision of ex­
ternal credit facilities, by providing the possibility of 
external financing, would alter the results of this paper 
significantly. The advantages of external as against in­
ternal means of financing have been argued at length in the 
literature from Vanek (1970, 1977) onwards. Although a 
formal dynamic model of the external financing case is be­
yond the scope of this paper, the analysis contained here 
should be viewed as giving support to Vanek's contention.
To overcome the problem of the "low level equilibrium trap" 
described above (i.e. the equilibrium at K *), it may be
necessary to establish specialized credit institutions to





























































































Putting L = <f>(K,m) we can write xvii) as: 
m<J>(K,m) = u 1 /F  (K, 4> (K, m)2.7 
a) Differentiating implicitly w.r.t. m gives:
A1
L + m<j) = u "*Ft_ (f> m LL m A2
So
where a =
d) = —---------m (1 - a£)u 7 < 0 for aB < 1
u" -F
A3
u ' U 7 -̂ = elasticity of marginal utility evaluated along an optimal pathu '
f l l *lB = ----- = marginal output elasticity of labour
f l
a < 0 , B < 0.
b) Differentiating A1 implicitly w.r.t. K gives:
So
“ +K - U "/FLK + FLL V 7
* u" Flk
a m - F u"LL
Using xi), this becomes:
* k -  r ^ f  *  0 f o r  0,6 *  1










































































































ai2 “ - ^ FKK
a21 = FL





- <f> F - c()/F <J>m L — LL m-
- LF ct>LK LL
LL m




1 2 21 --------- /pF + L (F F - F )/ A8,(1 - a8) “ KL ' LL KK KL-'
The characteristic equation of the system is:
A (ai1 + a22)X + (aH a22 ai 2a21) ° A9
This has two roots. If d̂L'\-\dL22 - al2a21^ ne9at;i-ve > the 
roots will be real and of opposite sign. This will clearly
jfebe the solution associated with where F > 0. This 
gives the saddle point solution at K^*,m^*. If, however,
(ai 1 a 2 2 “ ai2a21^ '*'S Positive ^ e  roots will be imaginary 
with positive real parts. This is the solution associated 





























































































1. A number of recent analyses have tried to combine as­
pects of both these approaches by supposing short-run 
employment variability within a fixed membership group. 
See Miyazaki and Neary (1983) and Bonin (1983).
2. The "managerial" theory of the firm is based on the no­
tion of the separation of ownership from control and 
holds that managers are able to influence the objec­
tives of the firm in their own interest.
3. This model has been criticised by de Meza (1983) on the 
grounds that it possesses no interior steady state so­
lution. However, the addition of the reasonable as­
sumption of imperfect substitutability between members 
and non-members, is, as de Meza shows, sufficient to 
rescue the model from this criticism.
4. In a study of Western European producer cooperatives
Younge and Rigge (1984) found that: "Loan capital is
frequently hard to raise because of ignorance about 
worker cooperatives in financial institutions. Banks 
are frequently reluctant to lend to cooperatives and 
even when they do interest rates may be higher than 
those charged to more conventionally run enterprises" 
(p. 3). In U.K. cooperatives, Jones and Backus (1977) 
found that "most investment is financed by retained 
earnings", and Stephen (1984) reports a similar situa­
tion in French producer cooperatives and the Spanish 
Mondragon group where "much capital is internally fi­




























































































group has developed its own bank, a credit cooperative, 
the resources of which are a major source of working cap­
ital for the group. The same argument follows through 
for cooperatives in developing countries such as those 
discussed by Espinosa and Zimbalist (1978) in Chile and 
by Uca (1983) in Turkey.
5. The Cooperative Bank in the U.K. will advance credit to 
cooperatives only on condition of a matching amount of 
internal finance. A similar situation exists for Yugo­
slav self-managed firms.
6. Recently a dynamic model of a labour-managed firm with 
endogenous employment has been presented by Feichtinger 
(1984), but the analysis is limited to short-run adjust­
ments through the assumption of a fixed capital stock. 
The present paper does not impose this restriction.
7. See Stephen (1984, p. 43-44) for an analysis of the case 
where the cooperative's objective includes employment, in 
and for itself. This additional objective seems to be 
important in the Mondragon case, according to reports of 
interviews made there. See Thomas and Logan (1982).




---- ----- , where FF x
3F
3x*
9. Along this locus therefore, there are locally constant 
returns to scale. Vanek dubs this the locus of maximum 
physical efficiency.
10. There is a large literature on the impact on investment 




























































































An infinite horizon, however, represents the general 
case, and is therefore adopted in this paper. A finite 
time horizon, /0,T/, can be treated as a special case 
of the present model.
11. In common with Dechert (1984) we may use a result 
proved by Michel (1982) which demonstrates that the 
transversality condition is necessary for optimality in 
a general class of models in which the Hamiltonian is 
concave in the control variables though not necessarily 
concave in the state variable.
12. Of course, the comparison is only valid for a given 
capital stock, and hence at the beginning of a pro­
gramme of capital accumulation when K(0) = Kq , since 
the accumulation paths of the two types of firm will 
differ over time.
13. In the static model where the labour-managed firm maxi­
mizes average revenue per head net of a capital charge
pO - rKper head (—------ ) , production is shown to take placeL
where e = 1. If the static self-financed firm were 
modelled by setting r = 0, as in Vanek (1977), the same 
result would emerge since pF = y, pF,. = 0 would be the 
optimal input rules. These results can be seen to fol­
low from the assumption of myopic decision making, 
which implies p = 0, and that there is only one period 
of production.
14. Specifically, the condition for xiv) to hold is aB < 1/ 
where a is the elasticity of marginal utility, 8 is the 
marginal output elasticity of employment. Typically a 




























































































15. So long as K is not too small. There may be a criti-
ccal value, K , below which the cooperative would not 
produce at all, since incomes would be too low to at­
tract any workers.
16. A self-financed labour-managed economy in which nei­
ther borrowing nor lending took place would therefore 
not yield the same "equivalence" property which Vanek 
(1970) and Dreze (1976) have claimed between a labour- 
managed economy under external financing and a profit- 
maximizing capitalist economy.
17. It should be noted however that the inverse associa­
tion between employment and accumulation will be weak
if a, and hence <J> , is close to zero. In the limit,K
however, employment will be at best insensitive to ac­
cumulation .
18. For example the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in Italy 
has a special fund of 100 billion Lira to finance co­
operative enterprise (Younge andRigge, Prospects for 
workers' cooperatives in Europe, Vol. 1 - Overview, 
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5 3 : M a u r i z i o  COTTA C a r e e r  a n d  R e c r u i t m e n t  P a t t e r n s  o f  
I t a l i a n  L e g i s l a t o r s .  A C o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
t h e  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  a  P o l a r i z e d  
S y s t e m  *
5 4 : M a t t e i  DOGAN How t o  becom e a  C a b i n e t  M i n i s t e r  i n  
I t a l y :  U n w r i t t e n  R u l e s  o f  t h e  
P o l i t i c a l  Game *
5 5 : M a r ia n o  BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
N a r c i s o  PIZARRO
The S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  S p a n i s h  Pow er 
E l i t e  1 9 3 9 - 1 9 7 9  *
5 6 : B e r e  RUSTEM/
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
P r e f e r e n c e s  i n  P o l i c y  O p t i m i z a t i o n  an d  
O p t im a l  E c o n o m ic  P o l i c y
5 7 : G i o r g i o  FREDDI B u r e a u c r a t i c  R a t i o n a l i t i e s  an d  t h e  
P r o s p e c t  f o r  P a r t y  G o v ern m en t *
59 : C h r i s t o p h e r  H i l l /  
J a m e s  MAYALL
The S a n c t i o n s  P r o b le m :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
an d  E u r o p e a n  P e r s p e c t i v e s
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6 0 : J e a n - P a u l  FITO U SSI A d j u s t i n g  t o  C o m p e t i t i v e  D e p r e s s i o n .  
The C a s e  o f  t h e  R e d u c t i o n  i n  W ork ing  
Tim e
6 1 : P h i l i p p e  LEFORT I d é o l o g i e  e t  M o r a le  B o u r g e o i s e  de l a  
F a m i l l e  d a n s  l e  M én a g e r  de  P a r i s  e t  l e  
S e c o n d  L i b r o  d i  F a m i g l i a ,  de  L . B .  
A l b e r t i  *
6 2  : P e t e r  BROCKMEIER D i e  D i c h t e r  und d a s  K r i t i s i e r e n
63  : H a n s - M a r t in  PAWLOWSKI Law an d  S o c i a l  C o n f l i c t
6 4 : M a r c e l l o  DE CECCO I t a l i a n  M o n e ta ry  P o l i c y  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  *
6 5 : G i a n p a o l o  ROSSINI I n t r a i n d u s t r y  T r a d e  i n  Two A r e a s :  Some 
A s p e c t s  o f  T r a d e  W ith in  a n d  O u t s i d e  a  
C u stom  U n io n
6 6 : W o lf g a n g  GEBAUER E u r o m a r k e t s  a n d  M o n e ta ry  C o n t r o l  : The 
D e u t sc h e m a r k  C a s e
6 7 :G e r d  WEINRICH On t h e  T h e o r y  o f  E f f e c t i v e  Demand 
u n d e r  S t o c h a s t i c  R a t i o n i n g
6 8 : S a u l  ESTR IN / 
D e r e k  C . JONES
The E f f e c t s  o f  W orker P a r t i c i p a t i o n  
upon  P r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  F r e n c h  P r o d u c e r  
C o o p e r a t i v e s  *
6 9 : B e r e  RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
On t h e  F o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
P r e f e r e n c e s :  A C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  
F r i s c h i a n  Schem e *
7 0 -.Werner MAIHOFER P o l i t i q u e  e t  M o r a le  *
7 1 : S am u e l  COHN F i v e  C e n t u r i e s  o f  D y in g  i n  S i e n a :  
C o m p a r i so n  w i t h  S o u t h e r n  F r a n c e  *
7 2 : W o lfg a n g  GEBAUER I n f l a t i o n  an d  I n t e r e s t :  t h e  F i s h e r  
T heorem  R e v i s i t e d
7 3 : P a t r i c k  NERHOT R a t i o n a l i s m  an d  t h e  Modern S t a t e  *
7 4 : P h i l i p p e  SCHMITTER D e m o c r a t i c  T h e o r y  a n d  N e o - C o r p o r a t i s t  
P r a c t i c e  *
7 5 : S h e i l a  A. CHAPMAN E a s t e r n  H ard  C u r r e n c y  D e b t  1 9 7 0 - 8 3 .  An 
O v e rv ie w
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7 6 : R i c h a r d  GRIFFITHS E c o n o m ic  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  P o l i c y  i n  t h e  
N e t h e r l a n d s  and  i t s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n s e q u e n c e s ,  May 1 9 4 5  -  M arch 1951  *
7 7 : S c o t t  NEWTON The 1 9 4 9  S t e r l i n g  C r i s i s  an d  B r i t i s h  
P o l i c y  t o w a r d s  E u r o p e a n  I n t e g r a t i o n  *
7 8 : G i o r g i o  FODOR Why d i d  E u ro p e  n e e d  a  M a r s h a l l  P l a n  i n  
1 9 4 7 ?  *
7 9 : P h i l i p p e  MIOCHE The O r i g i n s  o f  t h e  Monnet P l a n :  How a  
T r a n s i s t o r y  E x p e r i m e n t  a n s w e r e d  t o  
D e e p - R o o te d  N ee d s
8 0 : W erner ABELSHAUSER The E c o n o m ic  P o l i c y  o f  L u d w ig  E r h a r d
8 1 :H e l g e  PHARO The D o m e s t i c  an d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  N o rw e g ia n  
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
8 2 : H e i n e r  R .  ADAMSEN I n v e s t i t i o n s p o l i t i k  i n  d e r  
B u n d e s r e p u b l i k  D e u t s c h l a n d  1 9 4 9 - 1 9 5 1  *
8 3 : J e a n  BOUVIER L e  P l a n  M onnet e t  l 'E c o n o m i e  F r a n ç a i s e  
1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 2  *
8 4 : M a r i u c c i a  SALVATI I n d u s t r i a l  a n d  E co n o m ie  P o l i c y  i n  t h e  
I t a l i a n  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  *
8 5 : W i l l i a m  DIEBOLD, J r . T r a d e  a n d  P a y m e n ts  i n  W e ste rn  
E u ro p e  i n  H i s t o r i c a l  P e r s p e c t i v e :  
A P e r s o n a l  View By a n  I n t e r e s t e d  
P a r t y
8 6 : F r a n c e s  LYNCH F r e n c h  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  a  E u r o p e a n  
C o n t e x t
8 7 : G u n th e r  TEUBNER V e r r e c h t l i c h u n g . B e g r i f f e ,  M erk m ale ,  
G r e n z e n , A usw ege *
8 8 : M a r i a  SPINEDI L e s  C r i m e s  I n t e r n a t i o n a u x  de  l ' E t a t  
d a n s  l e s  T r a v a u x  de C o d i f i c a t i o n  de l a  
R e s p o n s a b i l i t é  d e s  E t a t s  E n t r e p r i s  p a r  
l e s  N a t i o n s  U n i e s  *
89  : J e l l e  V ISSER D i m e n s i o n s  o f  U n io n  Grow th i n  P o s t w a r  
W e s te r n  E u ro p e
9 0 : W i l l  BARTLETT U n e m p lo y m e n t , M i g r a t i o n  and 
I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i n  Y u g o s l a v i a ,  1 9 5 8 -  
1 9 7 7
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9 1 : W o lf g a n g  GEBAUER K o n d r a t i e f f ' s  L o n g  Waves
9 2 : E l i s a b e t h  DE GHELLINCK/ 
P a u l  A . GEROSKI/
A l e x i s  JACQUEMIN
I n t e r - I n d u s t r y  an d  I n t e r - T e m p o r a l  
V a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  E f f e c t  o f  T r a d e  on 
I n d u s t r y  P e r f o r m a n c e
9 3 : G u n th e r  TEUBNER/ 
H elm ut WILLKE
K o n t e x t  und A u to n o m ie .  
G e s e l l s c h a f t l i c h e  S e l b s t s t e u e r u n g  
d u r c h  R e f l e x i v e s  R e c h t  *
9 4 : W o lf g a n g  STREECK/
P h i l i p p e  C. SCHMITTER
C om m unity , M a r k e t ,  S t a t e -  an d  
A s s o c i a t i o n s .  The P r o s p e c t i v e  
C o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  I n t e r e s t  G o v e r n a n c e  
t o  S o c i a l  O rd e r
9 5 : N i g e l  GRIFFIN " V i r t u e  V e r s u s  L e t t e r s " : The S o c i e t y  
o f  J e s u s  1 5 5 0 - 1 5 8 0  and  t h e  E x p o r t  o f  
a n  I d e a
9 6 : A n d r e a s  KUNZ A r b e i t s b e z i e h u n g e n  und 
A r b e i t s k o n f l i k t e  im  o e f f e n t l i c h e n  
S e k t o r .  D e u t s c h l a n d  und 
G r o s s b r i t a n n i e n  im V e r g l e i c h  1 9 1 4 - 1 9 2 4  
*
9 7 : W o lfg a n g  STREECK N e o - C o r p o r a t i s t  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  
an d  t h e  E c o n o m ic  C r i s i s  i n  W est 
Germany *
9 8 : S im on  A . HORNER The I s l e  o f  Man an d  t h e  C h an n e l  
I s l a n d s  -  A S t u d y  o f  t h e i r  S t a t u s  
u n d e r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
an d  E u r o p e a n  Law
9 9 : D a n i e l  ROCHE Le  Monde d e s  Ombres
8 4 / 1 0 0 : G u n th e r  TEUBNER A f t e r  L e g a l  I n s t r u m e n t a l i s m ?  *
8 4 / 1 0 1 : P a t r i c k  NERHOT C o n t r i b u t i o n  a u x  D é b a t s  s u r  l e  D r o i t  
S u b j e c t i f  e t  l e  D r o i t  O b j e c t i f  comme 
S o u r c e s  du D r o i t  *
8 4 / 1 0 2 : J e l l e  VISSER The P o s i t i o n  o f  C e n t r a l  C o n f e d e r a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  U n io n  M ovem ents
8 4 / 1 0 3 : M a r c e l l o  DE CECCO The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e b t  P r o b le m  i n  t h e  
I n t e r - W a r  P e r i o d
8 4 / 1 0 4 :M. R a i n e r  LEPSIUS S o c i o l o g y  i n  Germany an d  A u s t r i a  1 9 1 8 -  
1 9 4 5 .  The E m i g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  S o c i a l  
S c i e n c e s  an d  i t s  C o n s e q u e n c e s .  The
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D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  S o c i o l o g y  i n  Germany 
a f t e r  t h e  S e c o n d  W orld  War, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 7
8 4 / 1 0 5 : D e r e k  JONES The E c o n o m ic  P e r f o r m a n c e s  o f  P r o d u c e r  
C o o p e r a t i o n s  w i t h i n  Command E c o n o m ie s :  
E v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  C a s e  o f  P o la n d
8 4 / 1 0 6 : P h i l i p p e  C .  SCHMITTER N e o - C o r p o r a t i s m  an d  t h e  S t a t e  *
8 4 / 1 0 7 : M a r c o s  BUSER D er E i n f l u s s  d e r  W i r t s c h a f t s v e r b a e n d e  
a u f  G e s e t z g e b u n g s p r o z e s s e  und d a s  
V o l l z u g s w e s e n  im B e r e i c h  d e s  
U m w e l t s c h u t z e s
8 4 / 1 0 8 : F r a n s  v a n  WAARDEN B u r e a u c r a c y  a r o u n d  t h e  S t a t e : V a r i e t i e s  
o f  C o l l e c t i v e  S e l f - R e g u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
D u tch  D a i r y  I n d u s t r y
8 4 / 1 0 9  : R u g g e r o  RANIERI The I t a l i a n  I r o n  a n d  S t e e l  I n d u s t r y  
an d  E u r o p e a n  I n t e g r a t i o n
8 4 / 1 1 0 : P e t e r  FARAGO N a c h f r a g e m a c h t  und d i e  k o l l e k t i v e n  
R e a k t i o n e n  d e r  N a h r u n g s m i t t e l i n d u s t r i e
8 4 / 1 1 1 : J e a n - P a u l  F IT O U S S I /
Kumuraswamy VELUPILLAI
A N o n - L i n e a r  M odel  o f  F l u c t u a t i o n s  in  
O u t p u t  i n  a  M ixed  Economy
8 4 / 1 1 2 : A n n a  E l i s a b e t t a  GALEOTTI I n d i v i d u a l i s m  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o ry
8 4 / 1 1 3 : D om enico  M a r io  NUTI M e r g e r s  an d  D i s e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  L a b o u r -  
M anaged  E c o n o m ie s
8 4 / 1 1 4 : S a u l  E S T R IN / Ja n  SVEJNAR E x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  E a r n i n g s  i n  
Y u g o s l a v i a :  The C a p i t a l  a n d  L a b o r  
S c h o o l s  C om pared
8 4 / 1 1 5 : A la n  CAWSON/John BALLARD A B i b l i o g r a p h y  o f  C o r p o r a t i s m
8 4 / 1 1 6 : R e i n h a r d  JOHN On t h e  Weak Axiom o f  R e v e a l e d  
P r e f e r e n c e  W ith o u t  Demand C o n t i n u i t y  
A s s u m p t i o n s
8 4 / 1 1 7 : R i c h a r d  T .G R IF F IT H S /  
F r a n c e s  F .B .LYNCH
The FRITALUX/FINEBEL N e g o t i a t i o n s  
1 9 4 9 / 1 9 5 0
8 4 / 1 1 8 : P i e r r e  DEHEZ M o n o p o l i s t i c  E q u i l i b r i u m  an d  
I n v o l u n t a r y  U nem ploym ent
8 4 / 1 1 9 :D o m e n ic o  M a r io  NUTI E c o n o m ic  a n d  F i n a n c i a l  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  
I n v e s t m e n t  P r o j e c t s ;  G e n e r a l  
P r i n c i p l e s  a n d  E . C .  P r o c e d u r e s
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8 4 / 1 2 0 : M a r c e l l o  DE CECCO M o n e ta ry  T h e o ry  a n d  Roman H i s t o r y
8 4 / 1 2 1 : M a r c e l l o  DE CECCO I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  
F i n a n c i a l  R e l a t i o n s
8 4 / 1 2 2 : M a r c e l l o  DE CECCO M odes o f  F i n a n c i a l  D e v e lo p m e n t :  
A m e r ic a n  B a n k i n g  D y n a m ic s  an d  W orld 
F i n a n c i a l  C r i s e s
8 4 / 1 2 3 : L i o n e l l o  F .  PUNZO/
Kumuraswamy VELUPILLAI
M u l t i s e c t o r a l  M o d e ls  an d  J o i n t  
P r o d u c t i o n
8 4 / 1 2 4 : J o h n  FARQUHARSON The M anagem ent o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and 
F o o d  S u p p l i e s  i n  G erm any , 1 9 4 4 - 4 7
8 4 / 1 2 5 : I a n  HARDEN/Norman LEWIS D e - L e g a l i s a t i o n  i n  B r i t a i n  i n  t h e  
1 9 8 0 s  *
8 4 / 1 2 6 : J o h n  CABLE E m p lo y e e  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  an d  F i r m  
P e r f o r m a n c e .  A P r i s o n e r s '  D ilem m a 
F ram ew ork
8 4 / 1 2 7 - . J e s p e r  JESPERSEN F i n a n c i a l  M ode l  B u i l d i n g  and  
F i n a n c i a l  M u l t i p l i e r s  o f  t h e  
D a n i s h  Economy
8 4 / 1 2 8 : Ugo PAGANO W e l f a r e , P r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  S e l f -  
M anagem ent
8 4 / 1 2 9  : M au reen  CAIN B e y o n d  I n f o r m a l  J u s t i c e  *
8 5 / 1 3 0 : 0 t f r i e d  HOEFFE P o l i t i c a l  J u s t i c e  -  O u t l i n e  o f  a  
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  T h e o r y
8 5 / 1 3 1 : S t u a r t  J .  WOOLF C h a r i t y  an d  F a m i l y  S u b s i s t e n c e :  
F l o r e n c e  i n  t h e  E a r l y  N i n e t e e n t h  
C e n t u r y
8 5 / 1 3 2 : M assim o  MARCOLIN The C a s a  d ' I n d u s t r i a  i n  B o l o g n a  d u r i n g  
t h e  N a p o l e o n i c  P e r i o d :  P u b l i c  R e l i e f  
an d  S u b s i s t e n c e  S t r a t e g i e s
8 5 / 1 3 3 : O s v a l d o  RAGGIO S t r u t t u r e  d i  p a r e n t e l a  e  c o n t r o l l o  
d e l l e  r i s o r s e  i n  u n ' a r e a  d i  t r a n s i t o :  
l a  V a l  F o n t a n a b u o n a  t r a  C in q u e  e 
S e i c e n t o
8 5 / 1 3 4 : R e n z o  SABBATINI Work a n d  F a m i l y  i n  a  L u c c h e s e  P a p e r -  
M ak in g  V i l l a g e  a t  t h e  B e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y
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8 5 / 1 3 5 : S a b i n e  JURATIC S o l i t u d e  f é m i n i n e  e t  t r a v a i l  d e s  
femmes à  P a r i s  à  l a  f i n  du X V IIIè m e  
s i è c l e
8 5 / 1 3 6 : L a u r e n c e  FONTAINE L e s  e f f e t s  d é s é q u i l i b r a n t s  du 
c o l p o r t a g e  s u r  l e s  s t r u c t u r e s  de 
f a m i l l e  e t  l e s  p r a t i q u e s  é c o n o m iq u e s  
d a n s  l a  v a l l é e  de  l ' O i s a n s ,  1 8 e - 1 9 e  
s i è c l e s
8 5 / 1 3 7 : C h r i s t o p h e r  JOHNSON A r t i s a n s  v s . F a b r i c a n t s :  U rb an  
P r o t o i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  an d  t h e  
E v o l u t i o n  o f  Work C u l t u r e  i n  
L o d èv e  and  B é d a r i e u x ,  1 7 4 0 - 1 8 3 0
8 5 / 1 3 8 : D a n i e l a  LOMBARDI L a  dem ande d ' a s s i s t a n c e  e t  l e s  r é p o n ­
s e s  d e s  a u t o r i t é s  u r b a i n e s  f a c e  à  
u n e  c r i s e  c o n j o n c t u r e l l e :  F l o r e n c e  
1 6 1 9 - 1 6 2 2
8 5 / 1 3 9 : 0 r s t r o m  MOLLER F i n a n c i n g  E u r o p e a n  I n t e g r a t i o n :  
The E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n it ie s  an d  t h e  
P r o p o s e d  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n .
8 5 / 1 4 0 : J o h n  PINDER E c o n o m ic  an d  S o c i a l  P o w e rs  o f  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  U n io n  a n d  t h e  Member S t a t e s :  
S u b o r d i n a t e  o r  C o o r d i n a t e  R e l a t i o n ­
s h i p
8 5 / 1 4 1 : V l a d  CONSTANTINESCO L a  R e p a r t i t i o n  d e s  C o m p e te n c e s  
E n t r e  l ' U n i o n  e t  l e s  E t a t s  Membres 
d a n s  l e  P r o j e t  d e  T r a i t e '  I n s t i t u a n t  
l ' U n i o n  E u r o p é e n n e .
8 5 / 1 4 2 : P e t e r  BRUECKNER F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  Pow er a n d  P o l i c y  
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